Paris Terrorists attacks

November 13th, 2015

Who we are
How we prepared
What happened
How we faced it
Lessons learnt
Who we are
The BSPP: an atypical military unit

French fire services:

France:

- 340,000 miles²
- 66,000,000 inhabitants
- 96 departments in continental France + 5 overseas

250,000 firefighters in France:

- 38,000 professional (15%) (Civilians)
- 200,000 volunteers (80%) (Civilians)
- 12,000 military (5%) in Paris (Army), Marseille (Navy) and FORMISC (National reinforcements - army)

In PARIS:

Double subordination: interiors (mission and budget) / defence (human resource and status):

- Youth
- Availability
- Discipline
- Doctrine consistency
- Military command and control
BSPP’s area of responsibility and territorial organisation

- 500 miles$^2$ 800 km$^2$
- 7 Millions inhabitants + 2 M commuters/day
- 45 Millions tourists/year
- 25% of the French GDP

➔ PARIS
➔ 123 municipalities / 3 departments
➔ Biscarrosse
➔ Kourou (French Guyana) / Europe’s spaceport

Principles:

- 1 Fire station for 10 km$^2$
- On spot in 10 min
- Mutual support
- 3 operational Groups
- 26 Operational Companies
- 76 Fire stations

Total strength: 8500 Firefighters including 60 doctors
A UNIT WITH MULTIPLE MISSIONS

Usual risk
• Emergency aid (80%)
• Car accidents (5%)

Critical risk:
• Fire-fighting (3%)
• Gas leaks...

Exceptional Risk: CBRN, USAR, Research dogs, Scuba Divers, High risk intervention teams (Terrorism, Urban unrests, Pandemic, flooding...)

Versatility of the French fire units
While under terrorist attacks, still 1,250 standard operations per day

- 2,000,000 calls a year (Phone numbers 18 or 112)
- 450,510 operations in 2015 (almost 1 out of 5 calls)
- Near 1,250 operations per day
Integration of the emergency network

BSPP’s Institutional partners

• Police

• SAMU (Health Care service)

• AASC (First aid associations)

• Army (Sentinel Operation)

→ Inter services coordination
Situation before NOV 2015
Geopolitical context

Terrorism not new in Europe!

→ A target among others in the French minds
The threat

• « worm in the fruit », terrorists are French citizens

France MARCH 2012: 7 persons killed

January 2015 events: Charlie Hebdo caricatures
• Shootings JAN 7th (12 journalists and police officers killed)
• Montrouge 8th (1 policewoman killed)
• Vincennes 9th (4 Jewish customers killed)

Charlie Hebdo newspaper attack:
Popular, political and intellectual mobilization

→ A very intellectual and Parisian subject?
→ A clever, harmful and mobile ENI
How BSPP was prepared?

- 1978 RED Plan
- 2005 RED PLAN ALPHA + RED PLAN Alpha Circulation (Police)
- 2006, PLAN JAUNE (In case of CBRNe operation)
- 2008 SINUS project (Counting/ Identification of the victims)
- 2009 CRISORSEC: Official Website dedicated to the crisis
Principles of RED PLAN ALPHA

Back to basic notions of disaster medicine
- Effort on survivable victims
- Triage
- Quick evacuation (kinetic and depth)
**Lessons learnt from previous attacks**

- **2011 new operational center, co-location of 3 pillars:**
  - Call center
  - BSPP Medical coordination
  - Crisis situation center

- **Field training and command post exercises**

- **Planning** on different scenarios (focus on active shooter)

- **Sharing of responsibilities: Command and control principles:**
  - **DO** – Director of operations (Prefet de police)
  - **COS** – Commander of Rescue operations (BSPP)
  - **DSM** – Director of the Medical Response (BSPP)
  - **COP** – Commander of Police Operations (Police)
  - **COPJ** – Commander of Judicial Operations (Justice)

- **Zoning of the area of operations:**
  - Exclusion Zone (Only SWAT units)
  - Controlled zone (Rescue units)
  - Support Zone (Command Post and logistics)
Friday, November 13th 2015
• A few local attacks since January 2015 (Villejuif 18 April, Isère 26 June, Thalys 21 August)
• Tension “under control” : Sentinel Military Operation, many police forces (COP21)
• Friday 13 evening, day before WE
• Mild weather, many customers in the bars and at the terrace of the restaurants
• France – Germany, football match at the “Stade de France” :
  ▪ 72 000 spectators ;
  ▪ President Hollande and high authorities in the stadium ;
  ▪ Live broadcast on TV.
• Two main locations:
  ✓ out of the Stade de France (72,000 people + HoS);
  ✓ shootings in the 10th and 11th arrondissements of Paris

• 7 attacks in 40 minutes (between 21:19 and 22:00).

• Fixation point at the BATACLAN concert hall (1,500 spectators)
Stade de France

Medical Posts:
1 – Quick Restaurant
2 – Restaurant
3 – Hotel Formule 1
4 – SDF medical center

Explosions

Command post:

Main effort?
Deception maneuver?
Kinetic and amplitude of the attacks

1st strike: 21.19 pm
2nd strike: 21.26 pm

Fear of a third strike

→ Concentration VS scattering
(ENI COA to disrupt the OPS response)
SPACE-TIME FRAMEWORK

Interventions under guns fire or insecure environment

PHASE 1 | PHASE 2 | PHASE 3 | PHASE 4
---|---|---|---
**REACTION** | **RECOVERY** | **CONCENTRATION OF EFFORTS** | **BACK TO NORMALITY**
21.19 | 22.00 | 23.30 | 4.21 | 8.00

- 0.20 Assault at the Bataclan Theatre

7 PRA en 40 Min

- Less phone calls at the call center
- Progressive closure of sites advanced medical posts
- Focusing on:
  - EVAC Stade de France
  - « Red Plan » at the Bataclan.
- Paris Fire Brigade capacities at 100%
- Ready for secondary MEDEVAC

DURATION OF THE ACTIVE PHASE: 8H
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

21.19 PM

OPEN

21.19: Explosion Stade de France

CLOSED

Operation Completed at 1.58

4 Killed

59 EVAC - 3H

21.26: 2nd site BICHAT

Operation completed BICHAT at 11.55 p.m.

13 Killed

22 EVAC - 2H

21.29: 3rd site République

Compared at 2:37

5 Killed

19 EVAC - 4H

21.38: 4th site CHARONNE

Operation completed at 0.46

19 Killed

17 EVAC - 3H

21.43: 5th site VOLTAIRE

Operation completed at 1.09

16 EVAC - 3H

21.49: 6th site BATACLAN

Operation completed BATACLAN: 5.30

82 Killed

114 EVAC - 5H

22.00: 7th site BEAUMARCHAIS

Operation completed BEAUMARCHAIS at 22.41

0 Killed

7 EVAC – 40 min

2.00 AM
Key operational issues
Key points in the initial commitment

- **Insecurity**
  → PBIED, shootings, omnipresent and evolutionary threat

- **Uncertainty**
  → Mumbai scenario in 2008?

- **Scale**
  → 700 call in 40 minutes

- **Resiliency**
  → spontaneous commitment of people
Main issues

Understanding: where, what, who?

- Enemy maneuver comprehension
- Information chain:
  - To the top (Political authorities)
  - To the team on the ground
  - 5 main sensors (call center, field, medics, liaison officers, medias)

Adequate commitment of means:

- Concentration of forces
- VS
- Preservation of Operational Capabilities (For a second wave)
- Standard operational response

Inter services coordination

- Command and control rules (DOS - COS, COP, COPJ)
Main issues

• **Operational Staff activated:**
  - Immediate posture at 21.25
  - Reinforced Posture at 21.30 (recall of personal staff)

• **Procedure under control: personal well trained thanks to weekly exercises**
  - Decision making process concentrated at the Operational Center (Priorities)
  - Decentralization of the execution phase (COS on spot)
  - Subsidiarity (Full autonomy at Group level)
Plan and anticipate all you can

- Immediate adaptation of the operational response for standard calls
- Reinforcements asked to the zonal command center (Helos,...)

Adapt to the situation

- Activation from 7 to 21 BSPP’s Intensive Care Ambulances within one hour.
- Naming of each spot + 1 COS (Emergency Cdr) and 1 DSM (1 doctor) per site
- Adaptation of the welcome message at the call center (18/112)
- Paris military hospitals for additional medical capabilities

Call for solidarity

- Use of social networks (Twitter: 29000; Facebook: 39000 in 1 hour)
- First aid associations
OPERATING FORCES

BSPP Firefighting units:
• 450 firefighters deployed on sites
• 250 firefighters in support (Ops Center + Logistics)
• 1000 firefighters in stand by (anticipation 2nd wave )
• 21 BSPP Medical teams deployed on sites
• 125 BSPP Vehicles deployed

Hospitals:
• 40 medical teams on sites

Rescue Association: 500 rescue workers deployed

Reinforcements by Civilian Firefighters:
• 260 including 60 deployed for evacuations only

Police forces:
• 3000 police officers

Military Forces:
• 1500 soldiers

TOTAL NUMBER OF VICTIMS:
• 130 Dead
• 481 Injured
• 4000 psychologically impacted
• 17 different nationalities
Lessons learnt

RESILIENCE
DOCTRINE
OPERATIONAL READINESS
EQUIPEMENT

& Next steps
Resilience

**BSPP Forces:**
- Restore the BSPP potential to 100 % for 08:00 on 14 Nov
- Stay ready... (Building fire in Paris 10 at 05:12 on November 14th)

**Medical and Psychological support to the firefighters**
- For 100% committed firefighters (850 firefighters examined by a psychiatrist)

**Education of the population:**
- Since Jan. 2016 : Initiation to the lifesaving skills
Doctrine

Operations:

• Continue to adapt to the threat
  → Secondary attack
  → Disrupt the operational response

• The « Plan Rouge Alpha » is the suitable response
  → Extraction + Damage control
  → Triage + stabilization
  → Priority to survivability: quick evacuation for extreme urgencies

• Zoning is adapted

• Secure the operational site by police and military forces
• Improve the CBRNe reactivity
  - **Uncertainty**: consider all scene as contaminated
  - **Modularity**, several sites could be impacted
  - Recognition – zoning – **early decontamination**

• Call up plan
  - Very efficient for calling up the doctors
  - Decentralized at Group level

• Improve the C2 capabilities
  - How to command and control more sites?
  - Enhance the Company officers C2 level
  - Enhance the Top down information flow (Sms, radio,...)

• Coordination with police assault teams
  - Casualties extraction team provided by the BSPP
Operational readiness & exercising

• **At Fire units level**
  - Identify the potential targets
  - Exercises involving local police forces
  - CBRN effort: not only for specialists (Immediate decontamination)

• **At BSPP level**
  - CPXs involving partners and liaison officers each week
  - Combined field exercises involving SAMU, Police and Rescue Associations
  - Education: Police officers participating in “COS” course
Operational readiness & procedures

• COMMON CALL CENTER FOR THE FIRE BRIGADE AND THE POLICE

Since January 2016, unified call center for the Euro Football championship starting 10 June
Improved Equipment

• First aid equipment
  ➢ Stretchers
  ➢ Damage control kits
  ➢ 1 support vehicle per Fire Group

• Protection
  ➢ Protection Kit for the fire stations
  ➢ Night stick, defense gas, bulletproof vest

Damage Control bags with:
- Tourniquets
- Hemostatic dressings
- Rescue blankets...
Improved Equipment

• VAC – Radio transmissions support vehicle
  ➢ Satellite operational transmissions
  ➢ WIFI bubble for data transfers
  ➢ Antares (radio system) + 4G multimodal case
  ➢ Phones, computers and mobile screen for reporting

• CCTV – video surveillance network
  • Access to the police cameras at the Operational Center
  • Soon extension to the transports network (Metro, Bus,...)

• Robotics & simulation
  • Exploration
Next steps
Studies and actions to go ahead

Necessity to consider that worst is not surely behind us

• **Worst case scenario: far more casualties**
  - Complexity of the evacuation maneuver
  - Logistic saturation (hospitals, services...)

• **Taboo attack**
  - School – church - Hospitals
  - Psychological dimension
  - Specific difficulties with the community

• **CBRN**
  → 13 scenarios identified by French authorities
• PARIS Hackathon
  - Priority to urgent calls (voice – stress – vocabulary)
  - How to better manage the Alert by social networks?
  - Advice to the population

• SINUS system extended at French national level
  - BSPP tasked to train all the fire services in France
  - Terror attacks could also affect other cities, not always PARIS

• Share experience with colleagues in Europe and the world
  - Lot of visits and conferences to share experience with colleagues
  - In June, meeting in Paris of the Heads of the 28 European Capital cities Fire services